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Abstract
AODV is a well-known reactive protocol designed for
MANET routing. All MANET routing protocols are designed
based on the assumption that all nodes cooperate without
maliciously disrupting the operation of the routing protocol. A
large number of attack types of varying severity are threatening
MANET. In this paper, we study the performance of AODV
routing protocol in the presence of some of the well-defined at-
tacks in MANET. We use NS-2 network simulator to analyse the
impacts of blackhole, grayhole, selfish and flooding attacks on
AODV protocol performance. While the blackhole and flooding
attacks have a severe impact on the AODV performance, the
selfish and grayhole attacks have less significant effect on it.
1. Introduction
Routing protocols in a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
are designed based on the assumption that all nodes are
cooperating to forward data from a source to a destination.
So, each node in a MANET acts both as a router and as a
host. A large number of routing protocols that are designed
to optimize the network performance for MANETs [4] have
been developed over the past years. The major issues involved
in designing a routing protocol for MANET are node mobil-
ity, bandwidth constrained and error prone wireless channel,
resource constrained nodes, and dynamic changing of the
network topology [1].
MANET routing protocols can be classified as proactive
or reactive protocols. In proactive (table-driven) routing pro-
tocols, each node maintains one or more tables containing
routing information to every other node in the network. On
the other hand, reactive (on-demand) routing protocols, routes
are only created when a source requires to send data to a
destination node which means that these protocols are initiated
by a source on-demand. In this paper, we focus on AODV
routing protocol [9] as it is one of the well-known and
extensively studied reactive protocols chosen by the IETF for
standardization.
MANET routing protocols are designed based on the
assumption that all nodes cooperate without maliciously dis-
rupting the operation of the protocol and do not provide
defense against malicious nodes [1]. However, the presence of
malicious nodes cannot be ignored in MANETs because of the
wireless nature of the network and the mobility of nodes that
adds a difficulty of distinguishing between stale routes and fake
routes. Nodes in MANET have limited computation and power
capabilities that introduce a difficulty to implement cryptog-
raphy and key management algorithms which require high
computations. A malicious node can attack the network layer
in MANET either by not forwarding packets or by changing
some parameters of routing messages such as sequence number
and IP addresses, sending fake messages several times and
sending fake routing information to disrupt routing operations
[1]. While there is large number of existing attacks, our paper
is focused on flooding, grayhole, selfish and blackhole attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
an overview of the AODV routing protocol is presented and
the impact of some attacks on MANET is discussed. In section
3, the simulation approach and parameters are presented. In
section 4, simulation results are given. In section 5, concluding
remarks are introduced.
2. Attacking AODV Protocol
Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (AODV) [9] is a
reactive routing protocol. It uses destination sequence numbers
to ensure the freshness of routes and guarantee loop freedom.
Routing information is stored only in the source node, the
destination node, and the intermediate nodes along the active
route which deal with data transmission. To find a path to a
destination, a node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet
to its neighbors using a new sequence number. Each node
that receives the broadcast sets up a reverse route towards the
source of the RREQ unless it has a fresher one. When the
destination or an intermediate node that has a fresh route to the
destination receives the RREQ, it unicasts a reply by sending
a route reply (RREP) packet along the reverse path established
at intermediate nodes during the route discovery process. Then
the source node starts sending data packets to the destination
node through the neighboring node that first responded with
an RREP. If a link is broken during transmission, an upstream
neighbor sends a route error (RERR) packet to its affected
neighbors.
2.1.AODV under Flooding Attack
In a flooding attack [6], a malicious node floods the
network with a large number of RREQs to non-existent des-
tinations in the network which drains a lot of the network
resources. Since the destination does not exist in the network,
a RREP packet cannot be generated by any node in the
network and all nodes keep on disseminating the RREQ packet.
This can introduce a difficulty to create new routes and to
transmit data packets specially when a large number of fake
RREQ packets are broadcast into the network. Thus, it leads
to congestion in the network and overflow of route table
in the intermediate nodes so that the nodes cannot receive
new RREQ packet, resulting in a DoS attack. Moreover,
unnecessary forwarding of these fake RREQ packets consumes
computational and power resources of nodes which are limited
in MANET [3].
2.2.AODV under Selfish Attack
In a selfish attack [5], a selfish node is the node that saves
its resources; such as battery, by not cooperating in the network
operations. A selfish node affects the network performance as
it does not correctly process routing or data packets based
on the routing protocol. The selfish node does not even send
HELLO messages and drops all data and control packets even
if these packets are sent to it. When a selfish node needs to
send data to another node, it starts working as normal AODV
operation. After it finishes sending its data, the node returns
to its silent mode and the selfish behavior by dropping all data
and routing packets directed through it. Neighbor nodes detect
the absence of the selfish node after an interval of silence, and
will assume that the node has left their neighborhood. So, they
invalidate their own route entries to this node and selfish node
becomes invisible to the network. The selfish node behavior
is known as a selective existence attack and it is a kind of a
passive attack as the node neither participates in the network
operation nor changes the content of packets.
2.3.AODV under Grayhole Attack
In a grayhole attack [7], a malicious node behaves normally
as a truthful node during the route discovery process by
replying with true RREP packets to the nodes that started
RREQ packets. After the source node starts sending data
through the malicious node, the malicious node starts dropping
these data packets to launch a denial of service (DoS) attack.
So, the malicious node forwards routing packets and drops
data packets. This selective dropping makes grayhole attacks
much more difficult to detect than blackhole attacks. Grayhole
attack is also known as node misbehaving attack [2] as the
malicious node misleads the network by agreeing to forward
the packets in the network.
2.4.AODV under Blackhole Attack
In a blackhole attack [10], a malicious node absorbs the
network traffic and drops all packets. Once the malicious node
receives an RREQ packet, without checking its routing table, it
immediately sends a false RREP packet with a high sequence
number and hop count equals 1 to spoof its neighbours that it
has the best route to the destination. Thus, the malicious node
reply will be received by the source node before any reply from
other nodes. Complying with the normal AODV operation, a
source node which receives multiple RREP chooses the RREP
with the largest destination sequence number and the smallest
hop count. Therefore, the source node ignores other RREP
packets and begins sending data packets through the malicious
node. When the data packets routed by the source node reach
the malicious node, it drops these data packets rather than
forwarding them to the destination node. The malicious node
attacks all RREQ packets in this way and takes over all routes.
Therefore all packets are sent to a point where they are not
forwarding anywhere.
3. Simulation Approach
NS-2 simulator [8] is used to simulate grayhole, blackhole,
flooding and selfish attacks. The simulation is used to anal-
yse the performance of AODV routing protocol under these
attacks. The parameters used are shown in Table I. Node
mobility was modelled with the random waypoint method.
Our simulation results are obtained from 3 different movement
scenarios, 3 different traffic scenarios and 3 different node-type
(malicious or non-malicious) scenarios which means that each
metric value is the mean of the 27 runs. The node-type scenario
is created randomly. In all cases, the 90% confidence interval
was small compared with the values being reported. While we
examined the effects of the attacks on both UDP and TCP
traffic, this paper is focused on their impact on the TCP traffic
only. We also examined the effect of these attacks for different
node speeds (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 m/s). Our analysis
shows that the node mobility has no significant effect on the
protocol performance in the presence of malicious nodes. So,
the paper results are focused only on the static network (0 m/s)
and a high mobility network (30 m/s).
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Time 180 s
Simulation Area 1000 m x 1000 m
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 70
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 5
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The ratio of packets that are
successfully delivered to a destination compared to the number
of packets that have been sent out by a source.
Throughput: The number of data bits delivered to the appli-
cation layer of a destination node in unit time measured in
bps.
End-to-End Delay (EED): The average time taken for a
packet to be transmitted across the network from a source to
a destination.
Routing Overhead: The number of routing packets for route
discovery and route maintenance needed to deliver the data
packets from sources to destinations.
Normalized Routing Load (NRL): The total number of
routing packets transmitted divided by the number of received
data packets.
Route Discovery Latency (RDL): The average delay between
the sending RREQ from a source and receiving the first
corresponding RREP.
Sent Data Packets: The total number of packets sent by all
source nodes during the simulation time.
4. Simulation Results
4.1.AODV under Flooding Attack
Figure 1 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the packet
delivery ratio for static nodes and for high node mobility. The
result shows that the packet delivery ratio decreases while
increasing the number of malicious nodes in the network and
this decrease is independent of the node mobility. The graph
shows that while the PDR decreases by 3% if there are 5
malicious nodes for static nodes, the PDR decreases by 5.5%
for the same number of malicious nodes in high node mobility.
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Figure 1. PDR under Flooding Attack
Figure 2 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
network throughput. The result shows that the throughput
decreases by 10% for each malicious node introduced in the
network and this decrease is independent of the node mobility.
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Figure 2. Throughput under Flooding Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the end-end-delay is
shown in Figure 3. The result shows that the delay has no
significant change for the first malicious node while the delay
increases as more malicious nodes are added in the network
up to 30% in the average if there are 5 malicious nodes and
this increase is independent of the node speed.
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Figure 3. EED under Flooding Attack
Figure 4 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the routing
overhead. The result shows that the routing overhead linearly
increasing by 50% in the average as the number of malicious
nodes in the network increases for static nodes while the
increase is about 70% for high node mobility.
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Figure 4. Routing Overhead under Flooding Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the normalized routing
load is shown in Figure 5. For static network, NRL increases
linearly by 80% for each added malicious node. With high
mobile nodes, the increase is about 100% for each added
malicious node, which is more obvious for large number of
malicious nodes.
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency is shown in Figure 6. The result shows that RDL
increases for each malicious node introduced in the network
and this increase is independent of the node mobility. For
small number of malicious nodes, RDL is less for high mobile
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Figure 5. NRL under Flooding Attack
nodes, but as the number of malicious nodes increases, the
highly mobile network will display a higher RDL than a static
network.
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Figure 6. RDL under Flooding Attack
Figure 7 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the total
number of packets sent by all sources. The result shows that
the total number of data packets sent by all the source nodes
decreases by 10% for each malicious node introduced in the
network and this decrease is independent of the node mobility.
4.2.AODV under Selfish Attack
Figure 8 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the packet
delivery ratio. The result shows that the packet delivery ratio
has no significant change as the number of malicious nodes
increases in the network and this is independent of the node
mobility.
Figure 9 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the net-
work throughput. The result shows that while the throughput
of high mobility nodes decreases by 40% relative to the static
nodes, the throughput has no significant change as the number
of malicious nodes increases.
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Figure 9. Throughput under Selfish Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the end-end-delay is
shown in Figure 10. The result shows that the delay has no
significant change as the number of malicious nodes increases
in the network and this is independent of the node mobility.
In addition, the delay for static network is better than for high
mobility nodes by approximately 10%.
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Figure 10. EED under Selfish Attack
Figure 11 shows the routing overhead under the selfish at-
tack as the number of malicious nodes increases. For the static
network, the first two malicious nodes have little effect; and
adding future malicious nodes reduces the overhead slightly.
In the highly mobile network, there is a significant reduction
in overhead for each malicious node added. These results are
slightly confusing as the selfish attack improves the routing
overhead. This is because the selfish nodes drops and does
not rebroadcast all received RREQ which decreases routing
overhead.
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Figure 11. Routing Overhead under Selfish Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the normalized routing
load is shown in Figure 12. The result shows that while
NRL has no significant change in the case of static nodes,
it decreases by 5% on the average for each malicious node
in the case of high mobility nodes. Because the number of
routing packets affects NRL, NRL is slightly improved as the
number of malicious nodes increases.
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency is shown in Figure 13. The result shows that RDL
for the high mobility nodes is better than the static nodes by
25% on the average regardless the number of malicious nodes
in the network.
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Figure 13. RDL under Selfish Attack
Figure 14 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the total
number of packets sent by all sources. The result shows that the
total number of data packets sent by all the source nodes has
no significant change as a results of malicious nodes presence
in the network and this is independent of the node mobility.
Moreover, static nodes can send approximately 150% data
packets than highly mobile nodes.
4.3.AODV under Grayhole Attack
As the grayhole node drops all data packets and the
selfish node drops all data and routing packets, the grayhole
attack simulation produces very similar results to the selfish
attack. This is because of the packet delivery ratio, network
throughput, end-end-delay, normalized routing load and rout-
ing overheads are calculated based on the received data packets
which are identical for the same simulation scenario.
Figure 15 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the packet
delivery ratio. The result shows that the packet delivery ratio
has not changed significantly as the number of malicious nodes
in increased in the network and this is independent of the node
mobility.
 15000
 16000
 17000
 18000
 19000
 20000
 21000
 22000
 23000
 24000
 25000
 0  1  2  3  4  5
S e
n t
 D
a t
a  
P a
c k
e t
s
Malicious Nodes Number
Selfish Attack
0 m/s
30 m/s
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Figure 15. PDR under Grayhole Attack
Figure 16 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
network throughput. The result shows that while the through-
put of high mobility nodes decreases by 35% relative to the
static nodes, the throughput is not affected by the number of
malicious nodes in the network.
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The effect of malicious nodes on the end-end-delay is
shown in Figure 17. The result shows that the delay of high
mobility nodes is better than static nodes by 10% and the
delay is not affected by the number of malicious nodes in the
network.
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Figure 17. EED under Grayhole Attack
Figure 18 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
routing overhead. The result shows that the routing overhead
for static nodes is better than its value in high mobility nodes
by about 10% and while it decreases by 5% for each malicious
node in the case of high mobility nodes, the routing overhead
decreases by 3% for each malicious node in the case of static
nodes. This confusing enhancement as discussed in selfish
attack is a result of dropping RREQ packets by the malicious
nodes.
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Figure 18. Routing Overhead under Grayhole Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the normalized routing
load is shown in Figure 19. The result shows that NRL for
static nodes is better than its value in high mobility nodes by
about 40% and while it decreases by 6% for each malicious
node in the case of high mobility nodes, the routing overhead
decreases by 4% for each malicious node in the case of static
nodes. Because the number of routing packets affects NRL,
NRL is slightly improved as the number of malicious nodes
increases.
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Figure 19. NRL under Grayhole Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency is shown in Figure 20. The result shows that RDL
for the high mobility nodes is better than the static nodes by
20% on the average regardless the number of malicious nodes
in the network.
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Figure 20. RDL under Grayhole Attack
Figure 21 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the total
number of packets sent by all sources. The result shows that
the total number of data packets sent by all source nodes has
no significant change as a result of presence of malicious nodes
in the network and this is independent of the node mobility.
Moreover, static nodes can send approximately 150% data
packets than highly mobile nodes.
4.4.AODV under Blackhole Attack
Figure 22 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the packet
delivery ratio. The result shows that the packet delivery ratio
has no significant change for the first malicious node while the
packet delivery ratio decreases by about 6% for each malicious
node in the network and this decrease is independent of the
node mobility.
Figure 23 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
network throughput. The result shows that the throughput
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Figure 22. PDR under Blackhole Attack
for static nodes is better than its value in high mobility
nodes by 15% and the throughput decreases by 20% for each
malicious node introduced in the network and this decrease is
independent of the node mobility.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 0  1  2  3  4  5
T h
r o
u g
h p
u t
Malicious Nodes Number
Blackhole Attack
0 m/s
30 m/s
Figure 23. Throughput under Blackhole Attack
The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is
shown in Figure 24. The first two malicious nodes reduce the
delay significantly; independently of whether the network is
static or highly mobile. Subsequent malicious nodes decrease
the delay by fewer ratios. While the results show that the delay
is reduced as the number of malicious nodes increases which
is slightly paradoxical as the attack improves the delay. This
is a misleading result because the delay is only measured on
packets that reach their destinations and since the blackhole
nodes drop all the received data, the number of packets that
will be considered in calculating the delay decreases as the
number of malicious nodes increases. So, the routes that avoid
blackhole nodes suffer less competition, and hence reduced
delay.
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Figure 25 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
routing overhead. The result shows that the routing overhead
has not significant change as a result of malicious nodes
presence in the network and this is independent of the node
mobility. These results have slightly confusion as the blackhole
attack improves the routing overhead. As mentioned before, the
explanation of the confusion of routing overhead enhancement
as the number of malicious nodes increases is because the
malicious nodes drop all received RREQ.
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The effect of malicious nodes on the normalized routing
load is shown in Figure 26. The result shows that the first three
malicious nodes have very little impact on the NRL while the
presence of other malicious nodes dramatically increases NRL.
While this conclusion is true for both mobile and static node,
the effect on static node is more remarkable.
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The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency is shown in Figure 27. While the result shows that RDL
decreases dramatically for each malicious node introduced
in the network which is a positive sign, this is a deceptive
advantage because RDL is computed based on the difference
between RREQ and RREP times. Since a malicious node under
blackhole attack replies with a fake RREP, RDL becomes
smaller under attack.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 1800
 2000
 0  1  2  3  4  5
R
o u
t i n
g  
D i
s c
o v
e r
y  
L a
t e
n c
y  
( R
D L
)
Malicious Nodes Number
Blackhole Attack
0 m/s
30 m/s
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Figure 28 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the total
number of packets sent by all sources. The result shows that the
total number of data packets sent by all source nodes increases
in static nodes by 30% than in high mobility nodes and these
packets decreases by 15% for each malicious node introduced
in the network and this decrease is independent of the node
mobility.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the behavior of flooding, selfish,
grayhole and blackhole attacks on AODV routing protocol
using NS-2 network simulator. Analysing the impact of these
attacks on the performance metrics such as packet delivery
ratio, network throughput, end-end-delay, routing overhead,
normalized routing load, routing discovery latency and sent
data packets is investigated.
From the simulation, we conclude that the blackhole and
flooding attacks have dramatic impact on the network perfor-
mance. The blackhole introduces a fake RREP which affects
the network performance and the flooding attack introduces a
fake RREQ which affects the network performance as well.
As most of the performance metrics depend on the number of
received data packets, little change is observed in these metrics
under grayhole and selfish attack because the malicious nodes
drop data packets in these attacks.
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